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Evidence is a paradigmatic “right kind of reason” (RKR) for belief. By contrast, a bribe is 
a paradigmatic “wrong kind of reason” (WKR) for belief. It is typically assumed that all practical 
reasons for belief are likewise WKRs. However, this thesis argues that certain types of practical 
reasons for belief—such as reasons for friends to believe well of each other—are neither RKRs 
nor WKRs. With respect to each of Mark Schroeder’s earmarks for distinguishing between RKRs 
and WKRs—their motivational efficacy, bearing on rationality, and bearing on correctness—some 
practical reasons cannot be clearly classified either as RKRs or as WKRs but instead fall 
somewhere in between. The upshot is that the distinction between RKRs and WKRs is not as clear-
cut as is typically assumed because there is a distinctive intermediate class of reasons: the “medial 
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Consider the following case: 
Accused Friend: Suppose that A, B, and C, and D hear a report about their mutual friend 
E claiming that E has embezzled money from his employer. The report references strong, 
but not overwhelmingly damning, circumstantial evidence that E is guilty of the 
accusation. D separately asks A, B, and C whether they believe this accusation. A 
explains that she believes that E is innocent because she is aware of counterevidence not 
mentioned in the report supporting E’s innocence. B states that he believes that E is 
innocent because E has offered him $1,000 to disbelieve any rumors that cast his 
character in a negative light. C admits that the evidence looks bad for E but claims that 
she nonetheless believes that E is innocent because, as E’s friend, she owes it to E to 
believe that he is innocent unless the evidence against him is overwhelming.  
  
According to a standard analysis of cases like these, the evidence (call this a token A-reason) that 
A cites as his motivating reason for belief is a paradigmatic example of a so-called “right kind of 
reason” (RKR) for belief. That is, evidence bears the earmarks which Mark Schroeder (2012b) 
identifies as characteristic features of RKRs: it 1) constitutes a motivationally efficacious reason 
for belief that 2) bears on the rationality of a belief in a distinctive way and 3) bears on the 
correctness of a belief. By contrast, the bribe (call this a token B-reason) that B cites as his 
motivating reason for belief is a paradigmatic example of a “wrong kind of reason” (WKR) for 
belief. It is very difficult (or perhaps impossible) to directly and consciously believe on the basis 
of a bribe, and bribes seem irrelevant to the rationality and correctness of a belief. If C’s citation 
of her obligation as E’s friend (call this a token C-reason) as her reason for belief is taken 
literally, according to the standard analysis, C is likewise citing a WKR. However, I suggest, 
there is something counterintuitive about this categorization: C-reasons somehow seems less like 
WKRs than B-reasons do.   
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It is disputed in the literature whether WKRs can be genuine normative reasons. 
Defenders of WKRs claim that WKRs can be normative reasons, while so-called “WKR 
skeptics” deny this claim.1 Those who are WKR skeptics about reasons for belief are typically 
called “evidentialists,” while those who accept that WKRs can be genuine normative reasons for 
belief are called “pragmatists” about reasons for belief.2 Evidentialists claim that the type of 
reason that A cites can be a genuine reason for belief while denying that the putative reasons 
cited by B and C can count as genuine normative reasons. Indeed, many evidentialists would 
deny that B’s and C’s self-reported reasons should be taken literally as claims about their 
motivating reasons for belief because it is impossible to believe on the basis of practical 
considerations. Pragmatists, by contrast, claim that the considerations cited by B and C can serve 
as genuine normative reasons for belief. What evidentialists and traditional pragmatists typically 
agree about, however, is that B-reasons and C-reasons stand or fall together: either both bribes 
and obligations of friendship can be normative reasons for belief, or neither can. 
My aim in this paper is to challenge the orthodox view that B-reasons and C-reasons 
ought to be equally assimilated as WKRs. It is intuitively plausible that C-reasons are 
importantly different from B-reasons (though it is admittedly difficult to spell out precisely what 
this intuitive difference amounts to). In what follows, I aim to make precise and vindicate the 
intuition that C-reasons differ from B-reasons by arguing that C-reasons are neither RKRs nor 
 
1 Another possibility is to reject the RKR/WKR distinction entirely (see, for example, 
McCormick (2018) and Rinard (2019)). However, for my purposes here I will ignore this 
possibility and assume that there is a real distinction between RKRs and WKRs. 
  
2 It is worth noting that the question of whether WKRs can possibly be normative reasons is 
distinct from the question of whether WKRs are actually normative reasons. For instance, one 
might be a pragmatist about reasons for belief who thinks that having true beliefs is supremely 
valuable and having false beliefs is highly disvaluable, and so there are rarely (or never) actually 
any WKRs for belief.  
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WKRs but instead are members of a distinct, intermediate class of reasons—the “medial kind of 
reason”—which fall in between RKRs and WKRs. That is, Mark Schroeder’s (2012b) “earmark 
test”—which provides a powerful diagnostic tool for determining whether a putative reason 
counts as an RKR or a WKR—does not render a clear verdict regarding whether to count these 
types of cases as RKRs or WKRs. With respect to each of Schroeder’s earmarks—motivational 
efficacy, rationality, and correctness—I will argue that C-reasons cannot be classified either as 
RKRs or as WKRs but instead fall somewhere in between. The upshot is that the distinction 
between RKRs and WKRs is not as clear-cut as is typically assumed. As such, there is a 
plausible yet unexplored middle ground between evidentialism and pragmatism about reasons for 
belief.  
My argument will proceed as follows. In section two, I develop an account of how C-
reasons operate and argue that the intuitive difference between B-reasons and C-reasons cannot 
be adequately explained by appealing to pragmatic or moral encroachment or to permissivist 
accounts of epistemic rationality. In section three, I elaborate on Schroeder’s earmark test and 
argue that testing C-reasons according to each earmark renders the verdict that the C-reasons are 
neither clearly RKRs nor clearly WKRs. In section four, I consider the upshot of my argument 
for the canonical distinction between RKRs and WKRs and for the debate between evidentialists 
and pragmatists about reasons for belief.  
2. Analyzing the Distinctiveness of C-Reasons 
In order to get an intuitive grasp of what sorts of practical considerations count as C-
reasons, let us consider some cases discussed in the literature on doxastic wronging and moral 
encroachment in which non-evidential considerations intuitively affect what one ought to 
believe. Many of these cases elicit similar intuitive reactions to C’s response in Accused Friend 
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when contrasted with cases in which someone forms a belief on the basis of financial 
considerations.3 Here are some examples involving (candidate) C-reasons: 
Wounded by Belief: Suppose that Mark has an alcohol problem and has been sober for 
eight months. Tonight there's a departmental colloquium for a visiting speaker, and 
throughout the reception, he withstands the temptation to have a drink. But, when he gets 
home his partner, Maria, smells the wine that the speaker spilled on his sleeve, and Mark 
can tell from the way Maria looks at him that she thinks he's fallen off the wagon. 
Although the evidence suggests that Mark has fallen off the wagon, would it be 
unreasonable for Mark to seek an apology for what Maria believes of him? (Basu 2019a: 
917, adapted from Basu and Schroeder (2019)) 
 
In this case, similarly to Accused Friend, it’s plausible that the fact that Maria would wrong 
Mark by believing ill of him gave her a reason against believing that he drank at the colloquium 
in a way that a bribe would not.  
While some reasons to believe well of others are due to the particular relationship the 
believer bears to the person about whom they are forming a belief, plausibly there are also 
impartial moral considerations in favor of believing well of others. Consider the following case:  
Racial Stereotype: Aidan is a waiter at a restaurant. As he leaves work for the night, he 
crosses paths with a Black family entering the restaurant. He has strong, but not flawless, 
inductive evidence supporting the prediction that any given set of Black diners at his 
restaurant will give their waiters tips lower than 20%. On the basis of the family’s race, 
he forms the belief that they will leave one of his colleagues a tip lower than 20%. (Fritz 
(2019), adapted from Basu (2019b)) 
 
In Racial Stereotype, it similarly seems plausible that the fact that Aidan’s belief involves a 
morally objectionable racial stereotype gave him a reason against believing in a way that a bribe 
would not.  
Moreover, having a generic disposition to believe well of others despite evidence that 
reflects poorly on their character—regardless of our relationship to them or specific morally 
 
3 Note that the relevant distinction here isn’t between prudential and moral considerations, for I 
am classifying “moral bribes”—e.g. a case in which an eccentric billionaire offers to donate a 




salient features like race—is plausibly a virtuous trait (as Preston-Roedder (2013) argues). If so, 
then we have reasons to believe well of others which likewise seem intuitively different than 
putative reasons provided by bribes. 
While I have called all of the above cases instances of C-reasons, these cases often are 
not treated as cases in which practical reasons for belief—and hence putative WKRs—are 
operative. Instead, they are sometimes analyzed either as instances of pragmatic or moral 
encroachment or as beliefs that are rational due to the permissive nature of epistemic rationality. 
Neither of these analyses must involve a commitment to taking C’s report as a literal citation of 
the reasons which directly motivate her to believe that E is innocent. Instead, a pragmatic 
encroacher might claim that C identifies practical features of her situation which affect the 
threshold for the evidence required to justify her belief (without counting as a reason for belief at 
all). Alternatively, a permissivist might interpret C’s report as citing the reasons why she adopted 
the rationally permissible epistemic standards that resulted in her forming a belief but not her 
direct motivating reasons for belief. If either of these approaches can explain the intuitive 
difference between B’s response and C’s response, then the cases above do not raise any 
problems for the traditional RKR/WKR distinction because they do not require that the 
distinction be invoked as an explanation of the difference.  
Yet in this section I will argue that ultimately neither of these approaches can vindicate 
the rationality of C’s response nor (more importantly) can they adequately satisfy an important 
desideratum of an analysis of cases like Accused Friend: explaining the intuitive difference 
between the types of considerations that B and C cite. As such, I will suggest, appealing to the 
RKR/WKR distinction is necessary to explain this intuitive difference. Along the way, I will 
clarify how, on my account, C-reasons operate.  
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2.1 Moral Encroachment 
Perhaps the most common way of attempting to accommodate the relevance of practical 
considerations for what we ought to believe is via the mechanism of pragmatic or moral 
encroachment. Analyzing Accused Friend as a case of encroachment promises to explain the 
intuitive difference between C’s response and B’s response without interpreting C’s response as 
a citation of a practical reason for belief.  
The most common way of formulating an account of pragmatic encroachment is to claim 
that practical stakes affect the evidential threshold for epistemic justification. In situations in 
which the practical costs of error are high, more evidence is required to epistemically justify 
belief than in situations in which the practical costs of error are low. On some accounts, moral 
encroachment operates similarly. What James Fritz (2019) calls “moderate moral 
encroachment”—according to which epistemic norms are sensitive to the moral features of 
actions and options—mirrors the structure of traditional pragmatic encroachment, except the 
relevant practical considerations are moral instead of merely prudential.4  
By contrast, what Fritz (2019) calls “radical moral encroachment” departs from 
traditional pragmatic encroachment by claiming that epistemic norms are sensitive to the moral 
features of beliefs themselves (independently of the beliefs’ role in guiding action). In radical 
moral encroachment, the moral costs of holding a belief itself raise the evidential threshold for 
epistemic justification. Cases like Accused Friend—in which a belief itself is at issue, and not 
the consequences of relying on the belief in practical reasoning—are most naturally analyzed as 
 
4 For example, here is an excerpt from a case in Fritz (2019): “César parked his car four hours 
ago, and he cannot currently see it. César’s friend Maryam informs him that there is a maniacal 
traffic officer on the loose, and if the officer sees César’s car parked illegally, he will fly into a 
homicidal rage and kill five innocents. César has the opportunity to check on his car and, if need 
be, to move it.” 
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instances of radical moral encroachment.5 As such, radical moral encroachment will be the focus 
of the rest of this section.  
In one recent account of radical moral encroachment, Rima Basu and Mark Schroeder 
(2019) argue that the non-derivative moral badness of a belief itself raises the evidential 
threshold necessary for epistemic justification.6 On their account, some beliefs—such as Maria’s 
or Aidan’s in Wounded by Belief and Racial Stereotype, respectively—can doxastically wrong 
the person about whom the belief is formed, which generates moral considerations against belief. 
(In some situations, the believer’s relationship to the person about whom they are forming the 
belief is presumably salient in determining the weight of the moral considerations.) As Basu and 
Schroeder put it, “As the moral considerations against belief increase, so does the evidence that 
is required in order to epistemically justify that belief” (2019: 201-202).  
Applying Basu’s and Schroeder’s analysis to Accused Friend, the friendship between C 
and E explains why there are especially strong moral considerations against C’s believing that E 
is guilty. These strong moral considerations thereby raise the threshold for the evidence 
necessary to epistemically justify C’s belief that E is guilty. Thus the fact that E is C’s friend can 
explain why C might not be epistemically justified in believing in E’s guilt even if a stranger 
 
5 This is not to deny that some cases similar to Accused Friend can also be analyzed as instances 
of moderate moral encroachment. For example, Sarah Moss argues that acting on false beliefs 
that involve racial profiling can be harmful (2018: 196-197). On Moss’s analysis, these cases 
count as instances of moderate moral encroachment. However, cases like Wounded by Belief, and 
Racial Stereotype are intended to elicit the intuitive judgment that the moral badness of beliefs 
themselves alone suffice to generate encroachment.     
 
6 In their co-authored paper, Basu and Schroeder do not explain precisely what the moral costs of 
belief consist in, perhaps because they disagree. Schroeder (2018) argues that only beliefs which 
falsely diminish the person about whom they are formed can wrong that person. For Schroeder, 
the relevant moral badness consists in the risk of wronging. By contrast, Basu (2019a) argues 
that even true beliefs can wrong if the believer fails to adopt the evidential threshold for belief 
consistent with acknowledging the other as a person.   
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who believed the same proposition on the basis of identical evidence would be epistemically 
justified in holding this belief. By contrast, the fact that B would financially benefit from 
believing in E’s innocence while a stranger who was not bribed wouldn’t similarly benefit does 
not generate the sort of consideration that raises the evidential threshold for epistemic 
justification. 
Yet Basu and Schroeder’s account (as it is specified so far) does not explain why C might 
rationally believe outright that E is innocent. That is, while their account explains how practical 
considerations can count against believing a proposition, it does not explain how practical 
considerations sometimes seem to count in favor of believing a proposition. This issue can be 
addressed by making a simple modification to their account, namely allowing that friends can 
doxastically wrong each other by failing to believe well of each other.7 If we make this 
amendment, then the ground is cleared for explaining why C could be epistemically justified in 
believing well of E due to their relationship: the moral considerations against suspension of 
judgment (and disbelief) lower the threshold for the evidence needed to epistemically justify C’s 
belief in E’s innocence.8 As such, at least at first glance, appealing to radical moral 
encroachment promises to explain the intuitive difference between B’s and C’s responses.  
 
7 In “Doxastic Wronging,” Basu and Schroeder officially remain neutral about whether we can 
doxastically wrong others by failing to believe a proposition about them (noting in footnote 19 
that they disagree with each other about this point). However, I find it very plausible that we can 
wrong others—especially our friends—by failing to believe well of them. To further motivate 
this point, doxastic wronging by failing to believe something may also occur in certain cases of 
testimony. For instance, Crewe and Ichikawa (forthcoming: 9) argue that there are positive 
epistemic norms requiring that hearers believe the testimony of victims of sexual assault. If 
Crewe and Ichikawa are right, failure to believe this testimony would intuitively be a case of 
doxastic wronging.) 
 
8 Schroeder elsewhere (2012a: 277-78) defends the view that the risks of failing to believe a 
proposition lower the threshold required to justify belief, so in principle he should have no 
objection to this sort of maneuver. Basu briefly discusses this issue, but ultimately comes down 
as ambivalent (2019c: 18).  
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However, it is not clear that moral encroachment has the resources to explain why C-
considerations can raise the threshold for belief while B-considerations cannot. Critics of radical 
moral encroachment such as Sarah Moss (2018) and James Fritz (2019) argue that the moral 
badness of beliefs themselves is not the sort of feature that can shift the evidential threshold for 
epistemic justification.9 Another (perhaps more serious) concern with radical moral 
encroachment is that it is hard-pressed to explain why the moral badness of a belief must be non-
derivative in order to affect the evidential threshold for justification. Suppose that it would be 
morally bad for C not to believe that E is innocent because E will be enraged and kill her family 
if C doesn’t believe that he is innocent. Intuitively, this only generates a B-consideration against 
believing that E is innocent.  
While this is an explanatory challenge for radical moral encroachment specifically, 
Worsnip (2020) argues that all accounts of encroachment (including moderate encroachment) 
lack a principled way of distinguishing between those practical considerations which affect the 
evidential threshold for justification and those which do not. After examining a variety of 
attempts by proponents of pragmatic encroachment to articulate the relevant principle, Worsnip 
 
9 Moss considers the possibility of expanding an account of moral encroachment to allow the 
moral costs of belief (as opposed to the risks of acting on a false belief) to bear on a belief’s 
epistemic status, i.e. to make space for radical moral encroachment. Yet Moss suggests that it is 
counterintuitive to suppose that the costs of a belief bear on its epistemic status, as refraining 
from believing a proposition because it would be costly is simply irrational wishful thinking 
(2018: 196). However, the cases considered above are intended to elicit the intuitive reaction that 
certain costs or benefits to belief do in fact bear differently on the rationality of beliefs. We 
should thus be hesitant to accept Moss’s argument in its full generality.  
James Fritz raises related, yet more theoretical, objections to moral encroachment. Fritz argues 
that, unlike features of actions and options, the moral features of beliefs themselves do not bear 
on their epistemic rationality. Rather, they bear the standard features of WKRs against belief 
because a) such features are not motivationally efficacious and b) it is “not plausible that the core 
standard of correctness for belief—the one intimately connected to what it is to believe—
emphasizes avoidance of morally bad mental states” (2019). I will argue in section three, 
however, that C-considerations are not in fact WKRs because they are (to some degree) 
motivationally efficacious and do bear on a relevant standard of correctness.  
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concludes that none of them are successful. If Worsnip’s conclusion is correct, it 
straightforwardly entails that moral encroachment (at least in any of its current forms) cannot 
explain the intuitive difference between B’s response and C’s response.  
Although these challenges to radical moral encroachment may not be insurmountable, 
they provide good reasons to doubt that appealing to moral encroachment alone to analyze 
Accused Friend can satisfy a crucial desideratum of an adequate analysis of the case: providing 
an explanation of the intuitive difference between B’s response and C’s response. My argument 
in section three aims to provide this explanation by appealing to the RKR/WKR distinction.10    
A second problem with employing the mechanism of moral encroachment to vindicate 
C’s response is that it fails to capture the full range of ways in which the practical considerations 
C cites operate. That is, friendship does not bear on how we ought to form beliefs about our 
friends merely by affecting the evidential threshold for epistemic justification. To illustrate this 
point, I quote at length Sarah Stroud’s description of how our procedures for forming beliefs 
about our friends differ from our procedures for forming beliefs about strangers: 
The first locus of difference is the cognitive activities we engage in when processing new 
data about our friends. What is distinctive in this domain is that we tend to devote more 
energy to defeating or minimizing the impact of unfavorable data than we otherwise 
would. To start with, we are more liable to scrutinize and to question the evidence being 
presented than we otherwise would be; we spend more time and energy doing this than 
we otherwise would. For example, we are more likely to ask ourselves various questions 
about the person telling the story, the answers to which could discredit the evidence being 
presented. We might ask ourselves: Is this person generally accurate, fair-minded, and 
trustworthy? Is she malicious, either in general or toward my friend in particular? Is it 
somehow in her interest that this story be true, or be thought true? We will spend more 
mental energy generating and assessing such possible discrediting factors than we 
typically do when we hear gossip about someone who is not a friend (just think how 
rarely we do these things in those cases)… 
In addition to these differences of method, friendship also yields different doxastic 
outcomes: different beliefs. I want to claim that not just the cognitive procedures we 
 
10 Perhaps the account that I develop in section three could be adopted by proponents of moral 
encroachment in order to meet this explanatory challenge. Yet even so, appeals to moral 
encroachment to explain Accused Friend face the additional obstacles discussed in this section.   
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deploy in assessing evidence but the set of beliefs we end up with will systematically 
differ when the subject of the story is our friend, and in particular that the latter will be 
more favorable than they otherwise would be. This is the second locus of the differential 
epistemic practices connected with friendship: where our friends are concerned, we draw 
different conclusions and make different inferences than we otherwise would (or than a 
detached observer would). I noted above that we spend more energy generating, that is, 
coming up with, alternative—and less damning—explanations of the reported conduct 
when the story we’re told is about a friend. But that isn’t all, for we are also likely to give 
such alternative constructions greater credence than we would for a nonfriend. And at the 
end of the day we are simply less likely to conclude that our friend acted disreputably, or 
that he is a bad person, than we would be in the case of a nonfriend. Friendship seems to 
alter not just the procedures we use to process new information but the conclusions we 
end up drawing. (2006: 505-506) 
 
According to Stroud’s account, the partiality that we demonstrate (and ought to demonstrate) 
towards friends is, in contrast with the moral encroacher’s account, operative at several different 
levels of our belief-forming procedure. Not only do our evidential thresholds differ when we 
form beliefs about our friends, but the ways that we process data and interpret evidence about 
our friends also differ. Consequently, an apparent implication of Stroud’s account—in contrast 
with moral encroachment—is that friends ought to form not only different beliefs but also 
different credences about each other than they would, given the same information, about non-
friends.11  
While defenders of moral encroachment might push back and deny that practical 
considerations should bear on how we initially process data or on how we form our credences, 
Stroud’s description of how friends do and ought to reason about each other strikes me as a 
 
11 While this objection applies to standard, threshold-shifting views of pragmatic encroachment, 
it does not apply to Kate Nolfi’s alternative weight-shifting account of pragmatic encroachment. 
Nolfi argues that instead of raising the evidential threshold for justified belief, some practical 
considerations “determine the epistemic weight of those other considerations that serve (or might 
potentially serve) as S’s basis for believing that p” (2019: 44). On Nolfi’s account, like on my 
proposal, friendship ought to lead us to give more weight to evidence that reflects well on our 
friends and less weight to evidence that reflects poorly on our friends. While I have some 
sympathy towards Nolfi’s proposal, its plausibility depends on her action-oriented account of 
epistemic rationality. For my purposes in this paper, I do not wish to incur a commitment to 
Nolfi’s account of epistemic rationality, so I will not consider Nolfi’s view at greater length.  
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phenomenologically plausible account of how the norms of friendship govern belief. Preserving 
this feature of its phenomenology is a desideratum in a theoretical account of the norms 
governing friendship. If moral encroachers deny that this is a plausible pre-theoretical account of 
how we feel we ought to form beliefs about friends, I have little more to say in response.12 If, 
however, moral encroachers resist Stroud’s account on theoretical grounds, I shall attempt to 
defuse such worries later in the paper by offering an alternative theoretical account of how 
friends ought to form beliefs about each other. 
The inadequacy of appealing to moral encroachment to explain cases similar to C’s is 
especially vivid when we consider cases in which practical considerations seem to count in favor 
of believing propositions with highly indecisive evidence. For instance, suppose that in Accused 
Friend an impartial observer would rationally judge there to be a 60% chance that E is guilty 
(and hence a 40% chance that E is innocent). Yet C, recall, doesn’t merely suspend judgment 
regarding E’s guilt, but believes outright that E is innocent. In order for moral encroachers to 
vindicate C’s belief, they would be committed to claiming that belief with a credence of less than 
 
12 Crawford (2019) offers one such criticism of Stroud’s account of epistemic partiality in 
friendship, on the grounds that Stroud’s account inaccurately characterizes authentic friendships. 
Crawford claims that epistemic partiality in friendship is inappropriate because it is partly 
constitutive of being a good friend “that one’s attitudes toward one’s friends are…appropriately 
responsive to the perceived features of one’s friends” (2019: 1587). Although Crawford cashes 
this out in theoretical terms by claiming that friends’ beliefs about each other ought to be 
responsive only to object-given reasons, her argument is grounded in large part on our pre-
theoretical judgments that friendship involves perceiving and esteeming our friends as how they 
really are. 
While Crawford’s observation is astute, it’s not clear to me that authentic friendship only 
involves seeing our friends as they really are. Rather, it’s plausible that our friends should see us 
(at least to some degree) as how we ought to be or how we want ourselves to be. Moreover, I 
worry that some theoretical commitments seep into Crawford’s critique of epistemic partiality in 
friendship, as Crawford seems to assume the very dichotomy between object-given and state-
given reasons (which is one way of cashing out the RKR/WKR distinction) that I aim to undercut 
in this essay. That is, Crawford assimilates all non-object-given putative reasons for belief to 
state-given reasons derived from the value of having a belief. However, I will argue in section 
3.3 that some non-RKRs are not generated simply by the value of having an attitude.  
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.5 is not only possible but rational. Yet this is an implausible result. If believing a proposition 
with a credence of .4 is even possible, it is both epistemically and structurally irrational.  
Appealing to practical reasons—which bear on the entire belief-forming process and can 
conflict with epistemic reasons—avoids this problem. On the account I am suggesting, friendship 
provides C with practical reasons to adopt a belief-forming process such that she interprets the 
evidence against her friend in a way that leads her to have a lower credence than an impartial 
observer would in E’s guilt and a higher credence in E’s innocence.13 This is not to deny that 
reasons of friendship operate by shifting the evidential threshold for C to form an outright 
belief—for in Stroud’s description above, good friends are more hesitant to believe ill of each 
other after all the evidence has come in—but rather to claim that, at least in some cases, practical 
considerations can have a more fundamental, thoroughgoing effect on the process by which one 
forms beliefs. Because moral encroachment only allows for practical considerations to operate at 
the level of assenting to a proposition, they cannot adequately capture this feature of Stroud’s 
account of epistemic partiality in friendship.  
Of course, an appealing feature of employing the framework of moral encroachment to 
analyze Accused Friend is that it preserves the epistemic rationality of C’s belief. By contrast, 
Stroud’s view entails that (according to standard conceptions of epistemic rationality) friendship 
sometimes requires epistemic irrationality because it requires us to employ epistemic standards 
that result in beliefs biased in favor of our friends. This is admittedly a cost of Stroud’s view, a 
cost which those who wish to deny the possibility of conflict between practical and epistemic 
reasons (such as Schroeder) would deem to be a very serious one. While one may wish to deny 
 
13 It’s worth noting that because C justifies her belief by reference to her particular relationship 
to E, my account does not entail that C must consider the credences of the impartial observer 
(who lacks this particular relationship to E) to be epistemically irrational.  
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the possibility of conflict on theoretical grounds, on an intuitive level it is plausible that conflict 
between different types of normative reasons is a general and ubiquitous phenomenon (as Fritz 
(2019) observes).14 It is unsurprising that friendship could provide further intuitive instances of 
this conflict. So, barring theoretical commitments that preclude the possibility of conflict 
between practical and epistemic rationality, there is no need to adhere to encroachment just to 
avoid positing such a conflict.   
2.2 Permissivism 
An alternative method for vindicating the rationality of C’s response without postulating 
a distinctive class of C-reasons for belief is to appeal to a permissivist account of rationality. In 
its most generic form, permissivism is the view that multiple incompatible doxastic attitudes can 
epistemically rationally be taken towards the same proposition given the same body of 
evidence.15 In short, a permissivist analysis of Accused Friend may be appealing if it could offer 
the following explanation of how it could be epistemically permissible for C but not B to believe 
that E is innocent: that on the basis of practical reasons which differ in kind from the practical 
reasons B cites, C adopts permissible epistemic standards that result in the belief that E is 
innocent.16 However, in this section, I argue that while the best version of permissivism avoids 
 
14 Fritz elaborates, “Sometimes, it’s morally bad to envy someone else’s possession, but the 
possession is nevertheless enviable. Sometimes, it’s morally bad to have a positive aesthetic 
reaction to a work of art, but the artwork is nevertheless aesthetically impressive. Mature moral 
agents have to learn to navigate situations like this: situations in which the moral reasons against 
an attitude are both powerful and reasons of the wrong kind” (2019).  
 
15 The important difference, though, is that permissivists do not say that shifting one’s evidential 
threshold is epistemically required, but at most practically required.   
 
16 To be clear, this is not the only analysis of the case available to permissivists. Indeed, the 
analysis that I offer in section three is compatible with permissivism. However, I take it that this 
analysis is the most promising way to explain the intuitive difference between B’s and C’s 
responses by employing only permissivist machinery.  
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the objections raised against analyzing Accused Friend via moral encroachment, appealing to 
permissivism alone cannot explain the difference between the considerations B and C cite and 
cannot easily vindicate the rationality of epistemic partiality in friendship.  
A common way of formulating permissivist accounts of epistemic rationality involves 
claiming that the “epistemic standards” (or, roughly synonymously, “evidential standards” or 
“evidential policies”) that one has fix what it is epistemically rational for one to believe, yet that 
the choice of evidential standards themselves is permissive. In Miriam Schoenfield’s influential 
defense of permissivism, she defines epistemic standards as “a function from bodies of evidence 
to doxastic states which the agent takes to be truth conducive. Roughly, this means that the agent 
has high confidence that forming opinions using her standards will result in her having high 
confidence in truths and low confidence in falsehoods” (2014: 199). Schoenfield grants that this 
notion of “epistemic standards” is still quite broad and admits of different interpretations.  
Alex Worsnip (forthcoming) usefully distinguishes between several different 
interpretations of what he calls “evidential standards” (synonymous with “epistemic standards”), 
two of which are relevant for our purposes. The first account of “evidential standards” refers to 
“our views about what evidentially supports what, and how strongly (or, in a Bayesian 
framework, our priors)” (forthcoming, chapter 4). (Let us call this the “wide sense” of epistemic 
standards.) The second (very different) account of evidential standards refers to “how much 
evidence we think is required to warrant all-out belief in some proposition.” (Let us call this the 
“narrow sense” of epistemic standards.) 
In two recent papers arguing that believing in ourselves and others can be epistemically 
rational even in situations in which failure is reasonably likely, Jennifer Morton and Sarah Paul 
(2018, 2019) appeal to the latter sort of permissivism. (Let’s call this the “narrow permissivist” 
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approach.) Morton and Paul argue that a “thinker’s sensitivity to new evidence” is permissive. 
They call this level of sensitivity an “evidential threshold” which provides an answer to the 
following question: “In a given context, how much evidence is required—that is, how 
compelling must the evidence be—before the thinker comes to a conclusion about what to 
believe or revises her current beliefs?” (2019: 190-91). On Morton’s and Paul’s view, practical 
considerations provide practical reasons to adopt a certain set of evidential standards (in the 
sense of adopting a certain evidential threshold). Unlike pragmatic encroachment, Morton’s and 
Paul’s view does not entail that there is a single epistemically permissible evidential threshold 
that shifts in response to practical considerations. Instead, on their account multiple evidential 
thresholds are epistemically permissible and practical considerations determine which evidential 
threshold one ought (in a practical, not epistemic sense, of “ought”) to adopt. On this analysis, 
shifting one’s evidential threshold is thus (at most) practically required, but not epistemically 
required.  
Morton and Paul develop this account to explain why we can rationally believe that we 
(or our friends) will succeed when undertaking difficult tasks, but it can be straightforwardly 
applied to analyze Accused Friend: C has practical reason to adopt an evidential threshold (from 
the set of epistemically permissible evidential thresholds) according to which less evidence is 
required for her to believe that E is innocent and more counterevidence is required for her to 
revise this belief.  
Morton’s and Paul's permissivist approach avoids the puzzle moral encroachers must 
address regarding how friendship can provide the sorts of considerations that bear on what we 
ought to believe. However, this narrow permissivist approach is still subject to some of the same 
objections as pragmatic encroachment. If Stroud’s account of epistemic partiality in friendship is 
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correct, more than our evidential threshold will change when we form beliefs about our friends. 
Rather, good friends’ entire belief-forming procedures, including their epistemic standards in the 
wide sense, will shift when they form beliefs about each other’s character traits, abilities, and 
behavior. For instance, friends give more weight to evidence that confirms propositions that 
reflect well on their friend and less weight to disconfirming evidence, seek out evidence that will 
confirm favorable propositions and avoid acquiring disconfirming evidence, and continue 
inquiry when the results are unfavorable and end inquiry as soon as the results are favorable. So, 
I suggest, what we might call “wide permissivism”—which allows that the different belief-
forming procedures friends employ are epistemically rational—is better able to explain the 
thoroughgoing differences Stroud identifies in how friends ought to form beliefs about each 
other.  
At least at first glance, the wide permissivist approach appears to be an attractive way of 
analyzing Accused Friend. It promises to explain why C’s response sounds like a more credible 
and less irrational response than B’s: C is describing her motivating reason for adopting the 
epistemic standards—roughly, the reason which she takes to be a normative reason for adopting 
her epistemic standards and which causes her to adopt her epistemic standards—that resulted in 
her believing that E is innocent. Because her epistemic standards caused C to believe that E is 
innocent, C might still be interpreted literally as citing her motivating reason for belief (or at 
least as citing her motivating reasons for acquiring a disposition to believe well of her friends). 
The reason C cites is simply an indirect motivating reason because it is mediated by her 
epistemic standards. By contrast, the reason cited by B is more naturally construed as a directly 
operative reason for belief not mediated by the adoption of his epistemic standards. That is, 
independently of B’s judgment of how strongly the evidence supports the proposition that E is 
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innocent, B employs the fact that he will profit from believing that E is innocent as a distinct 
premise in his final deliberation about what to believe which counts in favor of believing that E 
is innocent.  
On this analysis, because C’s belief is mediated by her (permissible) epistemic standards 
in a way that B’s is not, the wide permissivist analysis can claim that C’s belief is ex post 
rational while B’s belief is not. Moreover, because C’s cited reason for belief is mediated by 
evidence while B’s is not, C’s citation of her motivating reason for belief is more credible than 
B’s. Hence, the wide permissivist approach seems to offer a compelling analysis of the intuitive 
difference between B’s and C’s responses.  
The distinction between indirect and direct motivating reasons for belief does important 
work in this analysis of Accused Friend. Yet one might wonder whether putative indirect 
motivating reasons, such as the reasons for which one adopts epistemic standards, count as 
genuine motivating reasons for belief.  
One response is for the wide permissivist to deny that C is genuinely citing her 
motivating reason for belief and claim instead that C is only offering a causal explanation of why 
she holds her epistemic standards. On this interpretation, the wide permissivist analysis (like the 
encroachment analysis) refuses to take C’s response literally as a citation of her motivating 
reasons. But if the permissivist adopts this view, it is unclear how this analysis could explain the 
difference between B’s and C’s responses.  
Alternatively, a proponent of the wide permissivist analysis might appeal to Susanna 
Rinard’s (2019) argument that even if evidence is necessary to form a belief, practical 
considerations can constitute an agent’s motivating reason because evidence can be used as a 
mere means to believe. Rinard considers the example of someone who, convinced by Pascal’s 
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wager, undertakes a process of selectively exposing herself to evidence that will result in her 
believing in the existence of God. In this case, Rinard argues, the practical reasons the agent 
takes herself to have for believing in the existence of God serve as her motivating reasons, while 
evidence is used as a mere means to believe. While these practical reasons are not the direct basis 
of her belief, despite being indirect they can still count as motivating reasons for belief. 
Likewise, we might suppose, adopting certain epistemic standards can be a means to acquiring a 
desired belief-forming disposition which will result in beliefs that an agent takes herself to have 
reason to acquire. (Note that C does not aim to believe well of E in every situation but rather 
aims to be disposed to believe well of E so long as the evidence isn’t overwhelmingly damning.) 
As such, we can treat the indirect reason C cites as her genuine motivating reason.17   
Of course, Rinard’s account also explains how B-reasons can constitute motivating 
reasons for belief, so B’s response could be analyzed in precisely the same way as C’s response. 
So in order to explain the difference between B’s and C’s responses, this permissivist analysis 
must provide an account of how friendship and financial incentives generate fundamentally 
different kinds of reasons to adopt certain epistemic standards. One possible account could 
involve claiming that when we adopt our epistemic standards with regard to a certain 
proposition-type (e.g. propositions that refer to features of our friends’ character or prospects of 
success), we are committed to consistently employing them when forming beliefs about this 
proposition-type.18 Because there are not any proposition-types that we are routinely bribed to 
 
17 Rinard’s argument complicates matters because it entails that when evidence is used as a mere 
means to believe it does not count as a motivating reason. However, a proponent of this wide 
permissivist approach could reject this part of Rinard’s view and instead claim that evidence can 
serve as a partial motivating reason in such cases in addition to practical considerations.  
 
18 Cf. Nolfi’s (2019) argument (in the context of pragmatic encroachment) that those practical 
considerations which shift how we interpret the weight of evidence must bear on beliefs which 
facilitate suitable action across a wide range of circumstances.  
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believe, we in fact do not have reasons to adopt certain epistemic standards towards propositions 
we are bribed to believe. By contrast, we do consistently have practical reasons to adopt certain 
epistemic standards regarding the class of proposition-types regarding our friends’ character or 
prospects of success. Hence, this difference might explain why C’s response strikes us as more 
rational and as a more plausible description of her motivating reason than B’s response does.  
However, recall that B was bribed to disbelieve any proposition that casts E’s character in 
a negative light. This may be a smaller class of proposition-types than those to which C’s 
epistemic standards apply, but the size of the class doesn’t seem relevant. (Moreover, we could 
modify the scenario such that B is offered financial incentives to believe well of all of her 
friends. Intuitively this doesn’t generate a difference between B’s and C’s reasons). The 
permissivist thus needs to say more in order to vindicate the apparent difference between B-
reasons and C-reasons. While I cannot rule out alternative explanations, the most promising way 
to explain this difference, I suggest, is to treat indirect reasons for belief as likewise subject to 
the RKR/WKR distinction. In section three, I will develop an account that does this.  
Another way that one might push back against this permissivist analysis is to deny that 
C’s response can be accommodated solely by appealing to her reasons for adopting the epistemic 
standards that lead her to believe that E is innocent. That is, perhaps C is responding to a directly 
motivationally efficacious reason for belief generated by the norms of friendship that operates by 
serving as a premise in the final stages of her deliberation about what to believe. According to 
this interpretation, after C has evaluated the evidence and is deliberating about whether to 
believe that E is innocent, believe that E is guilty, or suspend judgment, C might take the fact 
that E is her friend to count as a reason to believe that E is innocent, or at least a reason against 
believing that E is guilty. The explanation of this tendency is simply that, as C explains, she 
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owes it to her friend to believe well of him. As such, C takes her obligation to E to provide a 
reason for her to believe well of E. This is not to say that friendship alone generates sufficient 
normative or motivating reason for belief, but rather that C takes herself to have some additional, 
direct reason to believe that E is innocent and is able to respond to this reason in deliberating 
about what to believe.  
Of course, one might be suspicious of the claim that friendship can generate directly 
motivationally efficacious reasons for belief. To make this seem like a more plausible analysis of 
the phenomenology of how friends form beliefs about each other, let’s add another feature to the 
original version of Accused Friend. Suppose that after C hears secondhand the rumor about E, E 
tells C that he is innocent. We might further stipulate that most people accused of embezzlement 
lie to their friends about it, so someone who overheard their conversation would take E’s 
testimony to be very weak evidence in support of E’s innocence (and suppose, moreover, that C 
knows all of this.) Nonetheless, it seems plausible that the fact that E is C’s friend gives C an 
additional reason to believe E to which C is (at least to some extent) capable of responding. 
While I have suggested that friendship involves a disposition to interpret a friend’s actions in a 
positive light, it is highly plausible that friendship also involves a disposition to take a friend at 
their word.19  
 
19 Richard Moran’s account of the reasons for belief uniquely produced by the speaker’s telling 
the listener can illuminate this point. Moran (2005) argues that accepting what someone tells you 
is not merely a matter of believing the proposition asserted but also of believing the teller 
himself. In telling his listener, the speaker’s offering his assurance of the truth of the utterance 
constitutes a reason for belief which is not simply evidential. As Moran puts it, there is a 
“‘relational’ or second-personal normativity” involved in such tellings that generates reasons for 
the listener to accept the assurance of the teller (2013: 134).  
If Moran’s account of the non-evidential reasons for belief provided by telling is correct, then 
very plausibly the hearer’s relationship to the teller intensifies the reasons generated by the 
teller’s offer of assurance. If we have reason to accept the assurances of strangers regarding the 
truth of what they tell us, we may have stronger reasons—perhaps due to our trust of a friend or 
to our enhanced obligation to respect them qua teller—to accept the assurances of our friends. 
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It rings true phenomenologically, I think, that we are more inclined to accept the 
assurances of our friends than of non-friends (and not merely because we have evidence that our 
friends are more reliable testifiers). One might think that reasons to accept our friends’ 
assurances only intensify the epistemic reasons for belief already provided by their testimony. I 
think it’s plausible, though, that the fact that a testifier is a friend directly provides a distinct, 
additional reason to believe the friend which cannot be reduced to an intensification of an 
existing reason. Someone deliberating about whether to believe a friend might reason as follows: 
“He is admittedly a fairly unreliable testifier, and he has lied in the past about what he has done. 
I recognize that I have good evidential reasons to suspend judgment. But nonetheless, he is my 
friend, and I owe it to him to believe what he tells me.” If this is right, at least in some 
circumstances friendship directly provides reasons to be epistemically partial to our friends by 
giving us additional, non-epistemic reasons to believe what they tell us.  
The purpose of this discussion of testimony from friends is to enhance the plausibility of 
my claim that friendship can generate direct reasons for belief that serve as premises 
(independent of their effect on one’s epistemic standards) in one’s final deliberation about what 
to believe. While I have not decisively established that friendship provides direct reasons that 
operate in this way, I hope at least to have made this suggestion plausible—and hence to have 
made plausible an interpretation of C’s response as involving a citation of her direct motivating 
reason for belief. 
In addition to the worry that the permissivist analysis cannot adequately explain the 
difference between the considerations that B and C cite, a second concern—specific to wide 
permissivism—is that in order to claim that C’s belief in E’s innocence is epistemically rational, 
a wide permissivist may be committed to a highly permissive—perhaps implausibly highly 
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permissive—account of epistemic rationality. As Schoenfield notes, “The fact that there are 
multiple permissible epistemic standards does not mean that any set of epistemic standards is 
permissible. It is consistent with permissivism that there be substantive rational requirements on 
a set of epistemic standards” (2014: n16).  
Yet if Stroud is right, the norms of friendship require employing significantly different 
epistemic standards when forming beliefs about one’s friends. Perhaps some subjective 
Bayesians would accept a highly permissive account of epistemic rationality that licenses 
significant epistemic partiality to one’s friends. However, I suggest that it would be preferable to 
explain the difference between B’s and C’s responses without committing to such a highly 
permissive account of epistemic rationality. 
Moreover, as Schoenfield stresses, we must take our “epistemic standards” as being truth-
conducive. Yet I have suggested that a good friend can consciously recognize that those 
epistemic standards which lead her to believe well of her friends are different from those she 
uses when forming beliefs about strangers.20 It seems prima facie very odd to consciously shift 
one’s epistemic standards (in the wide sense) from context to context while still taking them to 
be maximally truth-conducive. As an illustration of this point, consider this case: 
Identical Twins: Suppose that there are two suspects for a recent theft from the 
convenience store, and you have identical evidence that each suspect is guilty. To assure 
evidential parity, suppose that the two suspects—call them Bob and Rob—are identical 
twins. The security camera footage makes it evident that one of them committed the 
crime, but the footage is of low enough quality that it gives no indication of which twin it 
captured. You know both Bob and Rob very well and judge that they are equally likely to 
steal. Yet you are friends with Bob but not Rob.  
 
 
20 It’s worth noting that some proponents of epistemic partiality in friendship, such as Simon 
Keller, deny this point. Keller claims instead that friends simply ought not to think too hard 
about how friendship influences their beliefs (2007: 43). However, it is an unfortunate feature of 
his account that it entails that the norms of friendship cannot be consciously responded to and 
that friendship requires self-deception.   
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In this case, a proponent of the wide permissivist approach for vindicating epistemic 
partiality towards friends is committed to saying that it is epistemically permissible to treat 
identical evidence differently when you shift from forming a belief about Bob’s innocence to 
forming a belief about Rob’s innocence. If we individuate epistemic standards finely enough, it 
is in principle consistent with permissivism to allow that one could have very different epistemic 
standards for interpreting identical evidence as it bears on slightly different propositions. (And 
again, some subjective Bayesians might grant this.) However, it seems odd from a first-personal 
perspective to employ two very different sets of epistemic standards given identical evidence and 
yet take both sets of epistemic standards to be maximally truth-conducive. So while this type of 
case doesn’t decisively rule out efforts to vindicate the epistemic rationality of epistemic 
partiality in friendship, it generates some pressure to deny that employing such different 
epistemic standards when forming beliefs about one’s friends is epistemically rational.   
For all of these reasons, appeals to permissivist accounts of epistemic rationality as a 
complete explanation of the intuitive difference between B and C seem sufficiently tendentious 
that it is better to say that C has practical reasons to believe well of E which can conflict with 
what she has most epistemic reason to believe. (This is compatible, however, with allowing that 
permissivism can explain some of the intuitive acceptability of C’s response.)  
Let us review the ground covered in section two. I have argued that appeals to moral 
encroachment or permissivist accounts of epistemic rationality are neither promising ways of 
vindicating the epistemic rationality of epistemic partiality in friendship nor promising ways of 
explaining the intuitive difference between B’s response and C’s response. Yet identifying the 
respects in which a phenomenologically plausible account of the norms governing belief in 
friendship is captured by and the respects in which it diverges from these two alternative 
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accounts nonetheless has helped to sharpen our picture of how, precisely, friendship provides 
reasons for belief. I have argued that the encroachment approach is correct in the respect that 
friends ought to have different evidential thresholds for forming certain beliefs about each other. 
The wide permissivist approach fares better insofar as it can accommodate this insight from 
encroachment, while at the same time better explaining how, when forming beliefs about each 
other, friends employ thoroughgoingly different epistemic standards. As such, appealing to the 
different epistemic standards employed when forming beliefs about a friend can explain how 
friendship provides indirect reasons for belief. However, the wide permissivist analysis is 
explanatorily inadequate because it can neither explain how indirect C-reasons differ from 
indirect B-reasons nor accommodate direct C-reasons.  
While part of the appeal of the permissivist and encroachment approaches is that they 
seemed to offer ways to analyze Accused Friend without appealing to a distinctive class of 
putative WK-C-reasons, I suggest that it is necessary to appeal to the RKR/WKR distinction in 
order to provide an adequate explanation of the distinctiveness of C-reasons and to accommodate 
direct C-reasons. In section three, I will seek to show how attempting to classify B-reasons and 
C-reasons according to Schroeder’s earmark test for distinguishing RKRs and WKRs reveals 
important differences between B-reasons and C-reasons. As such, my claim that B-reasons are 
WKRs but C-reasons are not WKRs provides a more promising explanation of the intuitive 
difference between B-reasons and C-reasons.  
3. C-Reasons and the Earmark Test 
In Schroeder’s initial formulation of the earmark test, he notes three important 
differences between RKRs and WKRs. Schroeder focuses on the contrast between pragmatic and 
epistemic reasons for belief—and discusses the earmarks in terms specific to the distinction 
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between pragmatic and epistemic reasons for belief (e.g. by speaking of epistemic rationality)—
but takes these three differences to be characteristic of the RKR/WKR distinction in general:  
[First,] there is some substantial asymmetry in how straightforward or easy it is to believe 
on the basis of pragmatic versus epistemic reasons… 
[Second,] there seems to be a distinctive dimension of rational assessment of beliefs—
sometimes called epistemic rationality—that is affected by the epistemic reasons of 
which the subject is aware but not affected by the pragmatic reasons of which the subject 
is aware. The same observation goes, whether we are talking about the rationality of 
believing or rationality in believing—the distinction that epistemologists sometimes call 
the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification…Focusing on epistemic 
rationality—this distinct dimension of the rational assessment of beliefs—allows us to 
elide the question of whether there is also some sense in which Pascal showed belief in 
God to be rational, perhaps a more global or practical sense less central to 
epistemology…What is important is that there is some central dimension of rational 
assessment that is not affected by Pascalian considerations. 
A third important difference between epistemic and pragmatic reasons for belief is that 
epistemic, but not pragmatic, reasons appear to bear on the correctness of belief. A belief 
is correct just in case it is true, and epistemic reasons for belief bear on whether that 
belief is true, but pragmatic reasons are irrelevant to its truth. So in addition to being 
subject to asymmetry of motivation and to differentially bearing on the rationality of 
belief, epistemic reasons differ from pragmatic reasons in bearing on the standards of 
correctness for belief. (2012b: 459-60).21  
 
These three earmarks play a crucial role in identifying RKRs and WKRs. Schroeder asserts “a 
key methodological principle” in distinguishing RKRs from WKRs: “if it quacks like a duck, it’s 
a duck” (2012b: 480). In accordance with this principle, Schroeder claims, “if the reasons bear 
all the marks of right-kind reasons, they are right-kind reasons—after all, the ‘right-
kind’/‘wrong-kind’ distinction was just a catch-all label designed to cover an important class of 
differences that arise in a variety of domains” (2012b: 466, emphasis Schroeder’s). This is not to 
say that the earmarks constitute the RKR/WKR distinction—as answering the question of what 
 
21 Schroeder also identifies a fourth earmark, the intuitively different “flavor” of RKRs and 
WKRs. However, Schroeder notes that this fourth earmark is “arguably not a proper earmark in 
its own right, but just the report of the intuitive naturalness of classifying various putatively 
wrong-kind reasons together” (2012b: n3). I likewise suspect that the different flavor of RKRs 
and WKRs is too vague to count as an earmark in its own right, so in the rest of this paper I will 
focus only on the first three earmarks. 
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constitutes the distinction would be the task of a substantive theoretical account of the 
RKR/WKR distinction—but that they are a reliable diagnostic tool for determining whether a 
putative reason counts as an RKR or a WKR.22  
Applying the earmark test clearly renders many practical reasons to believe WKRs. 
However, I will argue in this section that C-reasons aren’t clearly classifiable as either RKRs or 
as WKRs according to the earmark test. For the sake of simplicity, I will focus only on the case 
of Accused Friend to illustrate that reasons to believe well of one’s friends cannot be easily 
classified as either RKRs or WKRs according to the earmark test.23 However, similar results 
should hold for the other types of C-reasons as well (though I will not argue for this point at 
length). I will consider the case of reasons to believe well of a friend with regard to each earmark 
in turn.   
 
 
22 Pamela Hieronymi (2013) objects that Schroeder’s earmarks are merely vague, pre-theoretical 
diagnostic tools which are unnecessary after an adequate account of the RKR/WKR distinction 
has been provided. If Hieronymi’s criticisms of the earmark test hold water, then my project in 
this paper—arguing that a certain class of putative practical reasons for belief can’t be clearly 
classified by using the earmarks test—would demonstrate nothing significant even if it is 
successful, as it appeals to a test whose results prove nothing important. 
However, Schroeder (2013) provides what I take to be a compelling response to Hieronymi’s 
objection. Schroeder argues that the earmarks capture the central phenomena that the RKR/WKR 
distinction is intended to explain: that some types of (putative) reasons are less motivationally 
efficacious and less relevant to rationality and correctness than other types of reasons. As such, 
they are useful tools for identifying the correct extension of a theoretical account of the 
RKR/WKR distinction. That is, if a putative reason exhibits each of the three earmarks, this is 
very strong evidence that it is an RKR. If it exhibits none of the three earmarks, this is very 
strong evidence that it is a WKR. Especially in the absence of a generally accepted theoretical 
account of the RKR/WKR distinction, appealing to the pre-theoretical arguments may actually 
be the best way to determine whether a putative reason counts as an RKR or a WKR. So if it 
turns out that some reasons aren’t clearly categorizable on the basis of the earmark test, this does 
have interesting implications for the RKR/WKR distinction. 
 
23 While I won’t consider at any length how B-reasons and C-reasons fare according to 
Schroeder’s fourth earmark, let me suggest that the intuitive difference between B-reasons and 
C-reasons that Accused Friend is intended to bring out captures some difference in their “flavor.”  
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3.1  Motivational Efficacy 
In Accused Friend, one reason that B’s claim—that he believes that E is innocent because 
E has offered him money to do so—is difficult to swallow is that it seems dubious that B is 
genuinely citing the motivating reason for his belief. That is, it seems extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to directly and consciously form a belief on the basis of a bribe. By contrast, C’s 
claim—that she believes that E is innocent because E is her friend—more plausibly constitutes a 
motivating reason for her belief to which C is directly and consciously responding. C’s answer 
nevertheless seems incomplete, for in order for her answer to constitute an honest response to the 
question, C must also have at least some evidential reasons for believing in E’s innocence. If C 
were to admit that the evidence overwhelmingly supports E’s guilt but still claimed to believe 
that E is innocent because E is her friend, we might suspect that her claim is disingenuous. If, 
however, C were to state that the evidence against E is strong but indecisive—perhaps that it 
makes E’s innocence roughly as likely as E’s guilt—yet that she positively believes that E is 
innocent because E is her friend, this seems like a credible report of the motivating reasons for 
her belief. After all, as Stroud observes, most of us routinely form more favorable beliefs about 
our friends than strangers might (and at least sometimes do so consciously). As such, it does not 
seem especially hard to directly and consciously believe well of someone because they are your 
friend.  
Intuitively, then, it is unclear whether to count such reasons of friendship as RKRs or as 
WKRs with regard to this first earmark. Reasons to believe well of someone because they are 
your friend are less motivationally efficacious than paradigmatic RKRs—evidential reasons—
and they typically need to be supplemented by at least some RKRs to jointly constitute sufficient 
motivating reasons for belief. Yet they are also more motivationally efficacious than 
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paradigmatic WKRs like bribes, and it seems perfectly natural to cite them as partial indirect or 
direct motivating reasons. As such, these reasons of friendship fall somewhere in between RKRs 
and WKRs according to the first earmark test.  
Of course, one might object to this proposal either by denying that any practical reasons 
are motivationally efficacious, or (from the opposite direction) by claiming that in fact all 
practical reasons are motivationally efficacious in the same way. Let’s consider these objections 
in turn.  
The first objection must target both of the following claims: 1) friendship can provide 
motivationally efficacious indirect reasons for belief, and 2) friendship can provide 
motivationally efficacious direct reasons for belief. One way of targeting 1) is to observe that if 
friends employ putative epistemic standards when forming beliefs about each other that they 
recognize are not maximally truth-conducive (as I have argued they do), it is difficult to see how 
these count as holding genuine epistemic standards. Indeed, it is difficult to see how someone 
could genuinely believe the outputs generated by epistemic standards which they take to be less 
than maximally truth-conducive. It sounds quasi-Moore-paradoxical to adopt epistemic standards 
that one doesn’t take to maximally truth-conducive.  
In response, I think this worry can be significantly mitigated by observing that we 
routinely form beliefs according to procedures which, upon reflection, we can recognize are not 
maximally truth-conducive. For instance, it is often noted in the literature on irrelevant 
influences on belief that many religious and philosophical beliefs are the products of belief-
forming procedures informed by irrelevant (i.e. non-truth-conducive) influences. Yet recognizing 
the causal role of irrelevant influences in the formation of our beliefs—and even recognizing that 
the standards we employed in forming our beliefs are not maximally truth-conducive—does not 
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cause us to immediately lose confidence in the beliefs generated by these procedures. As Rinard 
(2019) observes, “It is possible to acquire and retain certain beliefs, and regard them as true, 
even though you recognize that they were caused by a procedure not generally reliable at 
producing true beliefs” (2019: 776). We may admittedly experience some genealogical anxiety 
and hold our beliefs somewhat more tentatively when we recognize that our beliefs were 
produced in a manner which is not maximally truth-conducive, but this recognition often does 
not lead to thoroughgoing skepticism about all matters in which we employ such procedures.24 It 
is doubtless at least somewhat epistemically irrational to preserve our beliefs when we acquire 
higher-order evidence that the procedure by which we evaluated our first-order evidence in 
forming the beliefs is not maximally truth-conducive. Yet this is precisely the point: being a 
good friend is hard, and it sometimes requires epistemic irrationality, but it is surely possible.  
The perhaps the most worrisome objection to 2) is that it entails the falsehood of a 
principle of “transparency” which many philosophers find plausible: that “the deliberative 
question whether to believe that p inevitably gives way to the factual question whether p” (Shah 
2006: 481, emphasis Shah’s).  Accepting that there are directly motivationally efficacious 
practical reasons for belief entails a more thoroughgoing rejection of transparency than the 
suggestion that practical reasons can serve as indirect motivating reasons via the adoption of 
epistemic standards.  
One of the principal motivations for accepting transparency is that after introspecting on 
how we form beliefs, it accurately captures the phenomenology of this process. However, the 
scenarios that I considered in section 2.2 provide occasion to question this claim. It is plausible, I 
 
24 I find it plausible that the epistemic standards we employ in philosophy are less truth-
conducive than those which good friends employ when forming beliefs about their friends. So if 




have tried to show, that in deliberating about what to believe we might directly and consciously 
respond to reasons to believe what our friends tell us and to believe well of our friends. So while 
denying transparency requires biting a bullet, I don’t think the bullet is a fatal one.  
To object to my application of this first earmark from the opposite direction, one might 
insist that all practical reasons are in principle motivationally efficacious in the same way. That 
is, on the basis of both B-reasons and C-reasons one can equally easily adopt belief-forming 
procedures and epistemic standards that will result in forming one’s desired belief or belief-
forming disposition (e.g. by seeking out evidence that will confirm the desired belief and 
avoiding acquiring evidence that will disconfirm it, continuing inquiry when the results are 
unfavorable and ending inquiry as soon as the results are favorable, and giving more weight to 
evidence that confirms the desired belief and less weight to disconfirming evidence).25  
Another way to bring out this point is that there seems to be an asymmetry between B’s 
answers and C’s answers only when it involves a self-report about one’s own reasons for belief. 
While it sounds disingenuous to cite financial incentives as one’s own reasons for belief, it 
doesn’t sound so odd to cite financial incentives when describing someone else’s reasons for 
belief. For instance, if you ask me why Erica disbelieves in climate change, I might point out that 
Erica works as a lobbyist for the oil industry. This seems like a credible, if only partial, 
explanation of why Erica disbelieves in climate change. Similarly, if you ask why Jack is 
convinced that Jill is guilty despite the indecisive evidence against her, it seems like a legitimate 
response to explain that he has this belief because he hates her. So, a proponent of this line of 
thought might conclude, despite the appearance of a qualitative difference between B’s and C’s 
responses, their answers turn out to be very similar as explanations of the reason for their beliefs: 
 
25 Cf. Stephanie Leary’s (2017) argument that practical considerations (presumably of all sorts) 
can be reasons for belief that operate by making one more responsive to epistemic reasons.  
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both have adopted certain epistemic standards on the basis of practical considerations, and these 
practical considerations count as indirect motivating reasons.26    
To respond to this objection, first let me reiterate that in addition to serving as indirect 
reasons for belief by providing reasons to adopt different epistemic standards when forming 
beliefs about one’s friends, friendship plausibly can also provide reasons for belief which are 
directly motivationally efficacious. Reflecting on the phenomenology of forming beliefs about 
friends as opposed to the phenomenology of forming beliefs in response to incentives suggests, I 
think, that it is much more plausible that reasons of friendship could be directly motivationally 
efficacious than that reasons provided by financial incentives can. Even if there are some 
similarities in the ways in which reasons of friendship and financial incentives motivationally 
operate, this difference still drives a crucial wedge between them.  
Second, we can explain away the asymmetry between reporting one’s own reasons for 
belief and another person’s reasons for belief by observing that it is most natural to interpret self-
reported reasons for belief as a description of motivating reasons yet interpret a report of another 
person’s reasons for belief as mere explanatory reasons. Explanatory reasons offer a causal 
explanation of why an agent ϕ-ed, but (unlike motivating reasons) they need not be the basis, or 
the reason for which, an agent ϕ-ed and need not be recognized by the agent as a normative 
reason for ϕ-ing. In Stephanie Leary’s account: 
R is a motivating reason for which S ϕ-ed if and only if 
(i) S conceives of R as a normative reason to ϕ in some way 
(ii) (i) disposes S to ϕ, and 
(iii) (ii) causes S to ϕ (in the right way). (2017: 535) 
 
26 A proponent of the objection could even grant that some WKRs for belief are more 
motivationally efficacious than others. For instance, perhaps it is somewhat easier for reasons of 
friendship to inform our belief-forming procedure than for financial incentives to do so. But as 
Hieronymi (2013) points out, some RKRs are more motivationally efficacious than others, so 
observing some degree of motivational asymmetry among different classes of reasons doesn’t 




This rough account should suffice for our purposes of distinguishing between motivating and 
explanatory reasons. It’s natural to interpret C as citing the reason that she conceives of as a 
normative reason to believe that E is innocent, to be disposed (to some degree) to believe that E 
is innocent for this reason, and to actually believe that E is innocent in part because of this 
disposition. By contrast, the above explanation for why Erica does not believe in climate change 
provides a causal explanation of her belief but is not naturally interpreted as the basis of her 
belief or a reason that she conceives of as a normative reason for her belief.  
 The reason for this difference, I suggest, is that some practical considerations can more 
easily serve as conscious reasons to adopt certain epistemic standards. While it may be possible 
for Erica to consciously adopt her epistemic standards on the basis of financial incentives (by 
using the sort of method that Rinard (2019) describes), these financial incentives are more 
plausibly construed as causing Erica to unconsciously adopt her epistemic standards.27 By 
contrast, C can credibly be interpreted as citing her conscious motivating reasons for adopting 
the epistemic standards that resulted in her believing that E is innocent. This is not to deny that 
friendship often affects our epistemic standards at an unconscious level. The point is rather that 
friendship can also provide conscious motivating reasons for adopting epistemic standards. Thus 
C-reasons also differ from B-reasons in that they can more easily and straightforwardly be 
responded to as indirect reasons for belief.  
 
27 Leary’s account of motivating reasons, in which an agent must conceive of R as a reason, 
seems to rule out the possibility of unconscious motivating reasons. One could of course reject 
Leary’s account of what it is for a reason to count as a motivating reason to allow for the 
possibility of unconscious motivating reasons. Making this maneuver would create space for 
admitting that financial incentives could serve as Erica’s motivating reasons even if they are 
unconscious. However, this would not refute my main point: that C-reasons can more easily and 
straightforwardly serve as motivating reasons.  
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In sum, my claim in this section is that it is easier and more straightforward to believe on 
the basis of C-reasons than on B-reasons because C-reasons can be more easily consciously 
responded to as indirect motivating reasons for belief and (at least sometimes) as direct 
motivating reasons for belief. These two differences provide good reasons to resist assimilating 
C-reasons to WKRs in light of the first earmark.  
3.2  Rationality 
Schroeder’s second earmark involves the “distinctive type of rational assessment” that is 
affected by the RKRs of which a subject is aware. One initial motivation for evaluating B-
reasons and C-reasons differently according to the second earmark could result from a potential 
diagnosis of the intuitive, inchoate judgment that I sought to draw out in Accused Friend: that 
C’s belief is more rational than B’s. That proponents of pragmatic encroachment seek to 
vindicate the notion that the considerations that C cites bear on epistemic rationality—the 
primary “distinctive type of rational assessment” for beliefs—suggests that there is some 
intuitive pressure to categorize C-reasons and B-reasons differently with regard to this second 
earmark.   
However, in my objections to pragmatic encroachment and permissivism in section two, I 
argued that C’s belief might be epistemically irrational.28 In the account that I offered in section 
 
28 Reasons to believe well of one’s friends are not relevant to epistemic rationality given standard 
accounts of epistemic rationality (which I am granting in this paper). But insofar as Schroeder’s 
earmarks are intended to offer pre-theoretical diagnostic tools, one might worry that this earmark 
invokes an objectionably theory-laden conception of epistemic rationality (as Bastian (2019) 
notes). As such, it’s worth noting that on a revised conception of epistemic rationality—along the 
lines of Kate Nolfi’s action-oriented account of belief, for instance—there may be a way to 
vindicate the relevance of C-reasons for belief for epistemic rationality which is consistent with 
much of my proposal in section two. Nolfi argues that the function of belief is to serve as 
“flexible-use predictive tools to facilitate environmentally sensitive action selection across a 
variety of different circumstances and in the service of a variety of different potential ends…On 
the action-oriented approach, a belief enjoys one kind of positive epistemic status—i.e. a belief is 
appropriately subject to a species of epistemic praise—when it is well-suited to fulfill this action-
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two, it becomes difficult to see how C’s belief is any less epistemically irrational than B’s—and 
thus difficult to see how C-reasons fare differently than B-reasons according to the second 
earmark.  
Yet the crucial feature of the second earmark seems to be not that RKRs for belief must 
bear on epistemic rationality in particular, but rather that RKRs for belief bear on a privileged, 
distinctive type of rational assessment which is “central to epistemology.” In his discussion of 
how the second earmark applies to reasons for belief, Schroeder explains, “What is important is 
that there is some central dimension of rational assessment that is not affected by Pascalian 
considerations” (2012b: 460). Since the RKR/WKR distinction is intended to apply to a variety 
of types of attitude, the more general point is that for each attitude there is a distinctive mode of 
rational assessment.  
One could, of course, insist that epistemic rationality is the only distinctive sort of 
rationality at issue in applying the second earmark to reasons for belief. In response, I am willing 
to concede that epistemic rationality is the primary sort of distinctive rationality at issue, and that 
reasons for belief provided by friendship don’t bear on epistemic rationality shows that they 
aren’t RKRs. However, I find it plausible that there may be secondary distinctive and relevant 
notions of rationality that C-reasons bear on. For instance, I have argued that beliefs can be 
rationally assessed in terms of responsiveness to friendship-based reasons for belief which bear 
directly and immediately on beliefs formed about a friend. So even if the reasons generated by 
friendship do not bear on epistemic rationality—and hence are not RKRs according to this 
 
oriented proper function” (2019: 39). Since having beliefs somewhat biased in favor of our 
friends is useful across a variety of circumstances and in the service of a variety of different 
potential ends, on Nolfi’s account of epistemic rationality, being disposed to believe well of our 
friends could turn out to be epistemically rational. Because B-reasons are often highly 
circumstance-dependent, they do not (at least typically) bear on a belief’s flexible-use as a 
predictive tool. If Nolfi is right, then this strengthens my argument that C-reasons are not WKRs.  
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earmark—this does not entail that they are WKRs. Instead, if I can show that believing on the 
basis of such C-reasons is rational in a distinctive sense relevant to the RKR/WKR distinction 
(i.e. rational in a different way than believing on the basis of Pascalian or financial 
considerations might be rational), then this suggests that these C-reasons fall somewhere in 
between RKRs and WKRs. 
Instead of developing such an account now, I will punt this issue to section 3.3 because 
the second and third earmarks can naturally be interpreted as very closely related.29 On some 
accounts of rationality, an attitude is rational insofar as it is responsive to the reasons the agent 
has bearing on the correctness of the attitude. For this reason, an argument that there are 
secondary standards of correctness relevant to the RKR/WKR distinction will directly translate 
into an argument for a distinctive, secondary notion of rationality as well. If my argument goes 
through in section 3.3—that the standard of correctness for beliefs about friends is relevantly 
different from those standards of correctness which derive from norms which clearly generate 
only WKRs—then this will strength the case for my claim that the rational assessment of beliefs 
with regard to “friendship-based reasons for belief” likewise cannot be assimilated to the sort of 
rational assessment characteristic of WKRs. Let us wait to evaluate the success of my argument 
in 3.2 until considering the related argument in 3.3.  
3.3  Correctness 
The notion of a “standard of correctness” to which Schroeder appeals in his third earmark 
is arguably even more vague and theoretically loaded than that of epistemic rationality. 
Nonetheless, at least with regard to belief, the basic idea of a “standard of correctness” is 
straightforward enough: a belief is correct if and only if it is true. And since evidence is a guide 
 




to truth, evidence bears on the correctness of a belief, and thus counts as an RKR. Non-evidential 
considerations just are those considerations which don’t bear on the truth of the proposition 
which a belief takes as its object. So, it seems, according to this earmark all non-evidential 
considerations are WKRs.  
 However, in this section I will argue that beliefs can be subject to multiple standards of 
correctness. These secondary standards of correctness do not bear on all beliefs but only apply to 
a subset of beliefs in which the believer bears a specific relation (e.g. friendship) to an object 
(e.g. their friend) denoted in the proposition which the belief takes as its object. If beliefs are 
subject to such standards of correctness, then it’s again unclear how to classify C-reasons with 
respect to the third earmark because such beliefs might be “incorrect” with regard to a primary 
standard yet “correct” with regard to a secondary standard.  
Before developing my argument for this conclusion, let me flag some initial concerns that 
one might have about the argument’s ability to get off the ground. First, one might worry that 
even if there are secondary norms to which beliefs in friendship are subject, perhaps referring to 
secondary standards of correctness is at best awkward and at worst a category mistake. That is, 
the notion of correctness properly applies only to the “internal” or “constitutive” standards of an 
attitude.  
Yet as Hieronymi (2013) observes, we can pragmatically assess the correctness of all 
sorts of attitudes or actions. There is a good sense of “correctness,” I think, in which an attitude 
or action is correct just in case it satisfies a relevant norm. It is “correct” according to some 
norms of etiquette to set one’s fork on the left side of the plate. Likewise, it is “correct” 
according to the norms of friendship to believe well of a friend.  
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A more serious worry is that even if it makes sense to talk about an “external” standard of 
correctness, the sort of standard of correctness relevant to the earmark test must be a constitutive 
or internal standard—a standard of correctness built into the nature of the attitude. As Gertken 
and Kiesewetter (2017) note, philosophers who appeal to a standard of correctness when drawing 
the RKR/WKR distinction typically mean something like an “internal” standard of correctness. 
Schroeder likewise seems to mean something like this when he says, “The class of right-kind 
reasons with respect to any activity will need to depend on the nature of that activity, in some 
way” (2012b: 482-83).  
 In response to this objection, I concede both that the primary standard of correctness must 
be constitutive of the activity or attitude in question and that in order to be classified as an RKR 
according to this third earmark, a reason must bear on the primary standard of correctness. 
However, I will argue in this section that attitudes can be subject to a secondary standard of 
correctness which is not constitutive of the attitude, but which nonetheless applies to the attitude 
in a distinctive way relevant to the RKR/WKR distinction.  
To examine how these secondary standards of correctness operate, consider again the 
case of friendship. It is highly plausible that friendship is governed by a set of norms governing 
how friends ought to think, feel, and act towards each other. As Stroud (2006) persuasively 
argues, just as good friends are loyal to each other and defend each other’s character when they 
are criticized by others, good friends are disposed to believe well of each other. Just as our 
actions become subject to additional norms when we enter into a relationship of friendship with 
somebody, so too do our attitudes. For example, friends ought to feel affection towards each 
other and desire to be in each other’s presence. Likewise, friends ought to be disposed to believe 
well of each other and ought to believe what they tell each other (to a greater degree than 
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strangers). Simply put, being epistemically partial to your friends is part of being a good friend. 
Consequently, when we become friends with someone, our beliefs (and our belief-forming 
procedures) become subject to an additional norm.  
A variety of friendship’s features contribute to explaining how beliefs become subject to 
additional norms in friendship.30 Stroud suggests, for instance, that “friendship is importantly 
contingent on continued esteem for one’s friend’s merits and character” (2006: 511). Stroud 
suggests as well that “our friendships function as commitments. To be someone’s friend is to 
have cast your lot in with his and, indeed, with his good character; and this properly affects how 
you respond to new situations and new data” (2006: 512). If Stroud is right, then it is part of the 
nature of friendship that good friends are disposed to believe well of each other because these 
beliefs are conditions of the friendship itself.  
Beliefs in friendship may also become subject to additional norms because beliefs 
partially constitute a friendship. (This suggestion goes beyond, but is consistent with, Stroud’s 
explanation of the source of the norms of friendship governing belief.) In their paper on doxastic 
wronging, Basu and Schroeder remark, albeit without elaboration, “that cases of doxastic 
wronging are important because they dramatize the role that our beliefs about one another play in 
 
30 It is worth observing that my explanation of the source of the reasons friends have to believe 
well of each other excludes other accounts given in the literature. Simon Keller, another 
proponent of epistemic partiality in friendship, offers a rationale for why we ought to be 
epistemically partial towards our friends which does not appeal to the norms of friendship as 
such. Rather, Keller thinks that epistemic partiality is appropriate only in certain types of 
friendship. Keller (2018) suggests that the best Aristotelian friendships between friends of virtue 
do not involve any epistemic partiality because each friend is genuinely virtuous, so believing 
well of the friend simply involves accurately perceiving their character. While epistemic 
partiality isn’t a feature of friendship as such, Keller claims, reasons that we have to believe well 
of our friends bottom out in reasons we have to promote their well-being. Given our 
imperfections, we often have an interest in how others—especially our friends—think of us. 
Encouraging one’s friends when they are subject to self-doubt, for instance, is an important part 
of being a good friend. 
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constituting our interpersonal relationships—a powerful connection between belief and human 
sociality” (2019: 203). Schroeder (2018) claims that “our interpersonal relationships are in part 
constituted by our beliefs about one another. Insofar as our beliefs help to constitute our 
relationships, the effects of our beliefs on our relationships are not mediated by the effects of our 
beliefs on our actions or other behaviors.”31 If our beliefs about our friends partly constitute our 
friendships themselves, it is unsurprising that beliefs could come to be subject to additional 
norms—and moreover as evaluated as correct or incorrect qua friendship beliefs—insofar as they 
contribute well or poorly to a friendship.  
The claim that beliefs partially constitute our relationships explains how this secondary 
standard of correctness differs in important ways from, for instance, a standard of correctness 
which says that a belief is correct if and only if it maximizes expected utility. Norms of 
friendship involve standards of correctness which apply directly and immediately. Because 
beliefs themselves—and not their downstream consequences—partially constitute friendships, 
the beliefs themselves are likewise evaluable as correct or incorrect by the standard given by the 
norms of friendship. By contrast, those standards of correctness irrelevant to the RKR/WKR 
distinction—such as the standard that says a belief is correct if and only if it will maximize 
expected utility—are indirect and mediate. For example, if you believe that God exists because 
this belief maximizes expected utility, the belief is correct according to this standard simply 
because it is a mere causal means to realizing an end. So even if there is another standard of 
 
31 Schroeder (forthcoming) develops this suggestion in light of his interpretive theory of persons, 
according to which “a person is constituted by the best interpretation of what contribution their 
behavior makes to the world” (forthcoming: 14, emphasis Schroeder’s). However, I want to 
avoid the complications introduced by Schroeder’s interpretive theory of persons and instead 
focus only on the contribution that beliefs make to the constitution of relationships.  
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correctness to which beliefs are subject, such standards would generate only WKRs for belief. 
But in the case of friendship, believing well of a friend constitutes satisfying the norm.  
While the standard of correctness provided by friendship is “external” in the sense that it 
is not constitutive of the attitude of belief, the standard of correctness is not “external” in the 
sense that it assesses a belief according to anything which the belief produces external to itself. 
That is, the standard of correctness immediately assesses the belief itself and not its effects. By 
contrast, standards of correctness that count paradigmatic WKRs as correct typically assess only 
the effects of the attitude, i.e. something external to the attitude. This crucial difference thus 
supports the notion that reasons that bear on an immediate secondary standard of correctness are 
not as clearly WKRs as reasons that bear on a mediate secondary standard of correctness.  
One might object that my account is extensionally inadequate because other quasi-
Pascalian standards of correctness which seem irrelevant to the RKR/WKR distinction can also 
be directly and immediately assessed independently of their effects. For instance, suppose that 
my psychological makeup is such that believing that I am an excellent athlete is a constitutive 
part of my happiness. Believing that I am an excellent athlete partly constitutes the state of 
affairs that I expect will maximize my utility, and so this belief can be directly and immediately 
assessed as correct according to the standard of expected utility maximization.  
Barring the addition of further conditions to my account of how secondary standards of 
correctness are relevant to the WKR distinction, it admittedly does have the counterintuitive 
implication of entailing that such quasi-Pascalian standards of correctness are relevant to the 
RKR/WKR distinction. While this is a cost of the view as it is currently stated, I don’t think that 
it is a devastating objection. Let me briefly suggest two different lines of response to lessen the 
counterintuitiveness of this implication. First, it may suggest that there is in fact something 
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importantly different about all standards of correctness which directly and immediately apply to 
attitudes. That is, despite the prima facie similarities to Pascalian cases, the case above differs in 
a way relevant to the RKR/WKR distinction. Alternatively, this may simply reveal that my 
account needs to add more conditions to rule out these quasi-Pascalian cases.32  
Admittedly, these brief remarks leave many questions unanswered and might not wholly 
satisfy a skeptic about the relevance of secondary standards of correctness to the RKR/WKR 
distinction. Nonetheless, I think they make a presumptive case for supposing that while reasons 
to believe well of a friend should not be classified as RKRs with respect to the third earmark 
because they do not bear on a primary standard of correctness, neither should they—or any C-
reasons which similarly bear on immediate secondary standards of correctness—be classified as 
WKRs. 
If there is a secondary standard of correctness for beliefs relevant to the RKR/WKR 
distinction, this supports my claim in section 3.2 that its concomitant mode of rational 
assessment is likewise relevant to the RKR/WKR distinction. If a standard of correctness is 
genuinely normative—as the standard of correctness provided by friendship is—agents who 
form attitudes subject to this standard of correctness are rationally assessable in a distinctive 
way: according to how they respond to the reasons that bear on the attitude’s correctness. As 
such, my argument in this section that believing well of a friend satisfies a secondary standard of 
correctness suggests that reasons to believe well of a friend likewise bear on a secondary yet 
distinctive notion of rational assessment. Consequently, C-reasons should not be considered 
WKRs with respect to the second earmark either.  
 
32 I am inclined to prefer this latter response. Unfortunately, it may be a project for the future to 
articulate a more precise and more extensionally adequate account of which secondary standards 




If my argument in this paper is successful, it shows that Schroeder’s earmark test does 
not clearly categorize reasons to believe well of friends as either RKRs or WKRs. One might 
take this conclusion to constitute an objection to the earmark test and thereby judge that it fails to 
accurately categorize reasons which intuitively count as WKRs. This could indicate that the 
earmarks don’t provide an extensionally adequate pre-theoretical indication of whether a reason 
is an RKR or a WKR. However, the intuition I tried to bring out in Accused Friend—that there is 
a normatively significant difference between the reasons cited by B and those cited by C—
instead supports the conclusion that the RKR/WKR distinction is not as sharp as it has typically 
been assumed.  
This lack of sharpness in the RKR/WKR distinction could admit of either a (weaker) 
epistemic interpretation or a (stronger) metaphysical reading. On the epistemic interpretation, it 
is simply sometimes hard to tell whether a putative reason is an RKR or a WKR. On the 
metaphysical interpretation, there is a distinct class of reasons which are neither RKRs nor 
WKRs. If my argument in this paper succeeds, I think it supports the metaphysical interpretation. 
If our beliefs about our friends are subject to secondary norms, then such norms generate 
somewhat motivationally efficacious reasons—which are in some sense rational and correct—to 
believe well of our friends. Bearing characteristics of both RKRs and WKRs, such reasons are 
members of an in-between, medial class of reasons, which we might call the “medial kind of 
reason” (MKR). Of course, providing an account of MKRs—which would include integrating 
MKRs into a systematic, theoretically developed account of the RKR/WKR distinction—is a 
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major task which I cannot undertake here. So for now, I will leave open the many questions this 
account raises.33  
A further implication is that if the sorts of practical considerations discussed in this paper 
are intuitively acceptable reasons for belief, my argument here constitutes an objection to 
skepticism about WKRs for belief (i.e. evidentialism). The difficulties of accommodating cases 
in which practical considerations intuitively bear on what we ought to believe via machinery 
(moral encroachment or permissivism) compatible with evidentialism about reasons for beliefs 
suggests the need for an alternative analysis which is incompatible with evidentialism. While I 
have officially stayed neutral regarding whether WKRs can be genuine reasons, my argument 
offers WKR skeptics a way to allow that some practical considerations—those which most 
intuitively do bear on what we ought to believe—can be genuine normative reasons for belief. Of 
course, WKRs skeptics might also be attracted to MKR skepticism, but countenancing MKRs 
might strike some WKR skeptics as more palatable than countenancing WKRs. My proposal thus 
identifies another, previously overlooked option in the logical space of the normativity of reasons 
that some philosophers may find appealing: accepting MKRs but not WKRs as genuine reasons.  
 Finally, let me conclude by suggesting that my argument extends to reasons for other 
types of attitudes subject to the RKR/WKR distinction. If we have MKRs to believe well of our 
friends, we might also have MKRs to desire, admire, or love our friends. It is, quite plausibly, 
easier and more straightforward, more rational, and in some sense more correct to admire 
 
33 To name just a couple such questions: whether postulating MKRs is compatible with existing 
accounts of the RKR/WKR distinction, or whether it requires a new theoretical account 
altogether; and whether reasons which bear some marks of RKRs and some marks of WKRs are 
really a sui generis class of MKRs, or whether the RKR/WKR distinction is gradable (i.e. MKRs 
just are those reasons which fall in between pure RKRs and pure WKRs, such that an MKR is an 
RKR to the extent that it has the characteristics of an RKR and a WKR to the extent that it has 
the characteristics of a WKR).  
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someone because they are your friend than because you are offered a bribe to admire them.34 (If 
anything, the case for supposing that there are MKRs to have these attitudes towards a friend 
may be stronger than the case for supposing that there are MKRs to believe well of a friend.) If 





34 Likewise, other types of attitudes subject to norms outside of the domain of friendship 
plausibly admit of MKRs. For example, while it is often assumed that the fact that it would be 
morally wrong to be amused by a racist joke is a WKR against being amused by it (as D’Arms 
and Jacobson (2000) argue, though they put their point in terms of fittingness instead of WKRs), 
my analysis suggests that it might be an MKR. It seems plausible that it is easier and more 
straightforward, more rational in a distinctive sense, and more correct to not be amused by a 
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